The UMWA (United Mine Workers), an advocate from its beginnings of miners' health and safety, has not always supported women miners. Likewise government regulation has not always protected workers' (or women's rights) in mines. And some argue that some regulation at least may reduce job opportunities in mines, and not only for women (or children).
Moreover, today, in spite of regulation, which is sometimes haphazardly enforced, black lung persists. In the wake of the 2010 Upper Big Branch disaster, new regulations have been proposed. To what extent has regulation in the past worked to improve conditions for miners, and can new regulation work?
Women in Mining
In 1942, the UMWA condemned women's right to work in West Virginia's coal mines; in 1979 it was the other way, according to Carletta Savage's thesis, "Women Coal Miners: Another Chapter in Central Appalachia's Struggle Against Hegemony" (1999, West Virginia University, Morgantown): the Union saw having women miners' presence publicized as a way to get rid of the image of the miners as "tough necks" who paid little heed to safety.
Women and children have worked in mines since at least the sixteenth century, according to Savage, primarily as helpers in small, family-owned operations. Women and children on occasion also helped their fathers who worked for third parties, but in small numbers, making up perhaps no more than five percent of mine workers, says Savage. Some efforts were made by various states in the nineteenth-century U.S. to regulate (and outlaw) both female- and child-labor in mines, although not so much in the smaller (presumably family-owned, according to Savage) operations.
Rise of Unions
Unions entered the mines towards the end of the nineteenth century and made headway early in the twentieth, in their quest for higher wages, as well as better health and safety conditions.
Then, following several labor disputes, including an effort to evict striking miners in Matewan, West Virginia, which led to the Battle of Blair Mountain in 1921, unionized mines lost some to competition from cheaper laborers including immigrants, and perhaps as well to the defeat at Blair Mountain.
With the Depression however the UMWA soon regained ground. Impoverished Harlan County, Kentucky unionized in a bloody depression-era strike. By World War Two, coal strikes resulted in the U.S. government's, under Franklin Roosevelt, taking control of some mines. According to Life magazine however (February, 1943; "Coal Strike"), many of the rank-and-file miners, although "glum" about being forced to return to work, were just as happy to work for the Roosevelt government as for the UMWA's Lewis.
Black Lung and Regulation
Black lung benefits were provided on a state-by state basis initially, with Alabama taking the lead in 1952. Finally, in 1969, unions were instrumental in the passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, which adopted health standards for mines, and provided compensation for miners disabled by black lung. The federal government, which had previously acted as an arbitrator or protected the "running of coal," became the protector of worker safety. In practice however, the government seems to have had the most influence following a mine collapse or explosion, at which point it oversees the safety of the rescue crew.
Massey Mine Disaster and Black Lung
In spite of regulation, today black lung may be on the rise. After the 2010 Massey Upper Big Branch Mine disaster, according to Chris Hanby (May 19, 2011, "Autopsies of Massey Miners Reveal Black Lung"), who cites the Upper Big Branch Report commissioned by West Virginia governor Joe Wheeling (May, 2011), autopsies of the victims showed that many, at least seventeen of the twenty-nine victims, had black lung. This is a much higher number than normally expected. Among those suffering from black lung were even younger workers, in their twenties.
It's been claimed that Massey, which had been cited previously for pollution, had been skirting monitoring of air quality (which Massey insists was good prior to the explosion), that some methane monitors had not been turned on during a number of shifts over the six weeks preceding the blast. It's also been claimed that Massey's security warned workers of federal inspections.
Unions and Safety
According to Alison D. Morantz's (Stanford Law School) study, which looks at rates of traumatic and non-traumatic injuries that occurred in underground mines from 1993-2008, with a view that traumatic and especially fatal injuries are less likely to be subject to reporting bias, there are fewer traumatic injuries and fatalities recorded in union mines, particularly when the mines are large.
Morantz notes that previous post-1969 Coal Act studies of mine safety, which examined mines in the 70s and 80s, showed that union mines had or at least reported more disabling injuries than other mines, although at least one of the studies reported this was possibly due to "reporting bias" (a tendency not to report injuries in a non-union mine), and suggested that perhaps there was no relationship between unionization and post-1969 Coal Act injuries.
Morantz says that 1970s labor strife as well as reporting biases may have contributed to differences between her own findings for 1993-2008 and earlier studies' findings for the 70s. Morantz also says that she has controlled for more variables than previous studies had controlled for. These include the number of hours worked, the number of workers in the mine, the amount of coal extracted, the number of coal beds, the age of the mine, and the state it is located in. Morantz reports as well that union penetration in the mines has declined in recent history.
What Happened At Upper Big Branch?
The report to the governor on Massey's Upper Big Branch mine indicates that, for several weeks prior to the explosion, a foreman in the non-union mine may have rarely taken mandatory readings of methane levels, and that the miners struggled with water build-up and ventilation problems.
The long wall shearer, a machine that cuts coal from rock, was down for hours the morning of the disaster. There was also apparently a shortage of lime, which is supposed to be added to the coal when coal content is too high, to help prevent explosion. Shortly after the shearer was put back to work, the mine exploded.
The rescue crews that entered immediately after found helmets in pieces, bolts bent every which way, and bodies they could not yet reach.
Job Opportunities and Regulation
While the 1969 Health and Safety Act resulted in no fewer mining opportunities in two major coal states, Ohio and Illinois (in fact the regulation seems to have improved opportunities in Illinois), a subsequent environmental law, the 1970 Clean Air Act, did result in job loss in Ohio and Illinois (states with high sulfur coal), although not in other states with low-sulfur coals, according to John H. Hoag (1990, "Coal Mining Regulation and Employment"). Hoag surmises that the 1969 law did not result in job loss because the coal companies were required by the law to hire more workers.
Hoag's report seems to argue, that while some regulation may hurt jobs, it might be possible to legislate enough to protect jobs. In addition, some kinds of environmental regulation, which outlaw practices that use fewer workers, may have a positive effect on employment.
More Regulation for Coal?
In the wake of the Massey disaster new regulation has been proposed which would halve the legal limit for coal dust, which is explosive as well as a cause of lung disease (though it's claimed by some that silica in some coal is still a bigger factor in black lung than the coal dust itself). The new law would also require personal methane monitors be worn by some of the workers, monitors that would give results immediately; apparently current methane monitoring gives delayed results.
It's been argued by the coal companies that the new law will cost them, and not provide benefits. One question to ask is will new regulations be adhered to? The report to West Virginia Governor Wheeling on the Massey disaster reveals that current regulations anyway are perhaps not always adhered to, or even taken seriously, by all.
Methane Monitors for Miners
What about methane monitors for more miners then? Could the monitors become instrumental in facilitating mine safety where regulation alone has failed? – if every miner gets one, perhaps one that also monitors coal dust, if the data is properly "hashed" or encrypted to protect it from tampering, and miners get access to data that's crunched on the methane, coal dust, mine explosions, and health? (Getting monitors for all miners actually goes beyond what has been proposed by the new law. And some miners, of course, might want to opt out of having their personal health data crunched.)
Sources
- Brower, Shane; Chrapowicz, Sarah; Erb, Tiffany; Mackowiak, Tara. " Bloody Harlan: The Enduring Strike." (Accessed 2011).
- " Coal Strike." Life Magazine.(1943/02; Accessed 2011).
- "Coal Mining's Perils and Politics: A Massey Energy Timeline." NPR. (Accessed 2011).
- Hanby, Chris. (May 19, 2011.) "Autopsies of Massey Miners Reveal Black Lung." Huffington Post. (2011/05/19; accessed 2011).
- Hoag, John H. "Coal Mining Regulation and Employment." Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy: 25. (1990; accessed 2011).
- Kilkeary, Desmond. "The Battle of Blair Mountain." Chaparral. Glendale, CA: Glendale Community College. (2005/04; accessed 2011).
- McAteer, J. Davitt, and Associates, Upper Big Branch: Report to the Governor. (2011/05; accessed 2011).
- Morantz, Alison D. Coal Mine Safety: Do Unions Make a Difference? Stanford University. (Accessed 2011).
- Savage, Carletta. Women Coal Miners: Another Chapter in Central Appalachia's Struggle Against Hegemony. Morgantown, West Virgina: West Virginia University. (1999; accessed 2011).
Catherine E Whitehead - C. E. Whitehead holds degrees in education and linguistics. She likes languages, computers, and cooking.
